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Convergence and Conflation in Online Copyright
Christopher A. Cotropia* & James Gibson†

ABSTRACT
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is showing its age. Enacted in 1998,
the DMCA succeeded in its initial goal of bringing clarity to wildly
inconsistent judicial standards for online copyright infringement. But as time
has passed, the Act has been overtaken—not by developments in technology,
but by developments in copyright’s case law. Those cases are no longer as
divergent as they were in the last millennium. Instead, over time the judicial
standards and the statutory standards have converged, to the point where the
differences between them are few.
At first glance, this convergence seems unproblematic. After all, uniformity
was the DMCA’s goal, and convergence gets us closer to it. But a deeper
look reveals that convergence has significantly changed the cost/benefit
calculus for those whom the Act governs. The benefits of complying with the
Act’s regulatory requirements have decreased, because convergence means
that one can ignore the statute and rely solely on the case law. And the costs
of complying have increased, because convergence has paradoxically caused
courts to conflate the two different sets of standards, mixing and matching
them in unpredictable and counterproductive ways to create new, unintended
forms of copyright liability and immunity. In short, convergence has led to
conflation, which means that the best course for today’s online community is
to steer clear of the DMCA altogether.
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Convergence and Conflation in Online Copyright
INTRODUCTION
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act1 is the most important piece of
copyright legislation of the last forty years. Enacted in 1998, the DMCA did
many things, but its hallmark achievement was to immunize the routine
operations of online service providers from most liability for copyright
infringement.2 By doing so, the Act used statutory law to create national
uniformity, replacing judicial standards that varied greatly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and paving the way for the user-content platforms that dominate
modern culture and commerce today.3 It is no exaggeration to say that YouTube,
Facebook, and the like might not exist today were it not for the DMCA.4
What the Act did not do, however, was set the standards for online copyright
infringement. Instead, it established four safe harbors—telling us what conduct
did not infringe copyright, rather than telling us what conduct did infringe.5
Federal courts therefore retained considerable power to define what actually
constituted infringement online.6 When a service provider’s conduct fell within
1

Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 201, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998); see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 143 (2001) (discussing in detail the creation of the DMCA).
2 See Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1203-04 (2011) (“Not surprisingly, the congressional solution
represented a compromise between the demands of the content industries to impose liability on
internet intermediaries and the pleas of the internet industries to afford them sufficient
breathing room to operate and grow”); see also Niva Elkin Koren, Making Technology Visible:
Liability of Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 15, 28 (2005) (“The safe harbor regime provided ISPs with a shield that mostly kept
them out of copyright wars.”).
3 See Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 499, 510 (2017) (“As the term ‘safe harbor’ suggests, Title II of the DMCA was
intended to offer legal certainty to internet service providers and online platforms if their
conduct stayed within certain parameters.”).
4 See, e.g., id. at 504 (“The DMCA safe harbors have been a tremendous benefit to the U.S.
copyright system and to the U.S. economy . . . . [T]he internet safe harbors have propelled the
growth of social networking and other ‘Web 2.0’ businesses.”); Edward Lee, Decoding the
DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 269 (2009) (“[T]he DMCA safe harbors
have helped to foster tremendous growth in web applications.”).
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (defining the substantive requirements for falling within one of
the four the safe harbors).
6 “As provided in subsection (l), Section 512 is not intended to imply that a service provider is
or is not liable as an infringer either for conduct that qualifies for a limitation of liability or for
conduct that fails to so qualify. Rather, the limitations of liability apply if the provider is found
to be liable under existing principles of law.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted
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a safe harbor, a court could still find infringement, because the safe harbor merely
limited the available remedies.7 The inverse was true as well: conduct that fell
outside a safe harbor would not qualify as infringing unless the courts said so.8
What this meant is that even after passage of the legislation, courts were free to
fashion liability standards that favored service providers or copyright owners, as
they saw fit.
Nevertheless, despite courts’ opportunity to develop an independent case law
of online copyright infringement, over the past twenty years the judicial
standards and the statutory standards have converged. The case law’s standards
for liability have become the mirror image of the safe harbor standards for
immunity. In other words, when a service provider is liable for copyright
infringement, it also fails to fall within the safe harbors—and those that do fall
into the safe harbors are never found liable.
At first glance, this convergence of statute and case law seems both
unsurprising and unproblematic. After all, Congress clearly expressed a policy
preference when it defined the safe harbors, so why wouldn’t courts simply take
the cue and mold liability standards to mimic the contours of the statutory safe
harbors? Moreover, uniformity was the DMCA’s goal, and convergence gets us
closer to it.
On closer inspection, however, convergence has had two dubious effects.
First, it has altered the cost/benefit calculus inherent in the statutory scheme. The
benefits side of the calculus has changed because service providers can now rely
on the case law alone to immunize them from liability, without having to incur
the regulatory costs of DMCA compliance. And the cost side of the calculus has
changed because convergence has begun to paradoxically cause courts to
conflate irrelevant DMCA provisions with the substantive law of infringement,
creating new, unintended, and unwarranted forms of both copyright liability and
copyright immunity. In short, convergence has led to conflation, and the result
is a DMCA that may now be doing more harm than good.

in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649.
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (allowing for injunctive relief even against service providers who qualify
for immunity under one of the safe harbors).
8 See id. § 512(l) (noting that “[t]he failure of a service provider’s conduct to qualify for limitation
of liability under this section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the
service provider that the service provider’s conduct is not infringing under this title or any other
defense”).
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This article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we explain why and how the
DMCA was originally enacted, the important role it played at the time and the
power that courts had to define liability even after the Act’s passage. Part II
shows that over the next two decades, the case law’s liability definitions
converged with the DMCA’s standards, leaving almost no daylight between the
statute and the case law. Part III demonstrates that this convergence has
decreased the upside of the DMCA safe harbors, increased the downside, and
caused harmful conflation of legal standards that should have remained separate.
In the end, then, the once-vital DMCA may now be a net loss for copyright law.
I.

CREATION
A. Courts

Back in the early days of the Internet, long before Instagram and Twitter and
Reddit, there was Usenet. Essentially a vast electronic message board organized
into subject-specific “newsgroups,” Usenet may seem pedestrian today, when
almost every website has user forums and threaded discussions. But at the time,
the main sources of online content were closed communities like America
Online, where the variety of material was subject to the limits of top-down
curation. In contrast, Usenet was entirely user-generated. It was the first
platform that really revealed the mind-boggling diversity of content that the
Internet could supply through the collective efforts of millions of everyday
users.9 One could find Usenet newsgroups on topics as varied as homebuilt
airplanes, non-parasitic transparent nematodes, and real and imaginary bunnies
who cause trouble.10
As with any platform based on user-generated content, Usenet came with the
risk that unlicensed copyrighted material would make its way into the system.
That’s what happened in 1994, when Dennis Erlich, a minister-turned-critic of
the Church of Scientology, posted several critiques of the Church in Usenet’s
alt.religion.scientology newsgroup. The critiques included excerpts from the
writings of Scientology’s founder, L. Ron Hubbard, whose copyrights were
9

This bottom-up, user-controlled nature of Usenet is reflected in its name, which derived from
“Unix users’ network”—a network of Unix programmers who created the platform in 1979 to
discuss the problems and experiences with the popular programming language. See Michael
Hauben, The Social Forces Behind the Development of Usenet, in RONDA HAUBEN & MICHAEL
HAUBEN, NETIZENS NETBOOK ch. 3 (1996), http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120/ch106.x03.
10 Those would be the Usenet newsgroups rec.aviation.homebuilt, bionet.celegans, and
alt.devilbunnies, respectively.
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owned by Religious Technology Center, the Church’s publishing arm.11 RTC
filed a federal lawsuit in California, and the court soon issued a preliminary
injunction against Erlich’s continued posting of the Scientology material, finding
it likely that he had violated copyright law.12
The case got really interesting, however, when the court considered RTC’s
claims against two other parties, Tom Klemesrud and Netcom On-Line
Communication Services. Klemesrud operated a small electronic bulletin board
service through which his subscribers (of which Erlich was one) could access the
Internet. And Klemesrud’s bulletin board was able to provide that access because
it was itself a customer of Netcom, which at the time was one of the country’s
largest Internet service providers.13 To put it simply, Erlich’s excerpts of the
Scientology material were able to reach Usenet subscribers because Klemesrud
connected Erlich to his electronic bulletin board and because Netcom connected
the bulletin board to the Internet. So the networks the two parties operated had
played an undeniable role in providing Erlich’s postings to the many servers
around the world that carried Usenet content. The question was whether that
intermediary role warranted the imposition of copyright liability.
The precedents on this question were few. The previous year, in Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, a judge in the same California district as Netcom
had issued a preliminary injunction against the operator of an electronic bulletin
board on which users had posted unlicensed copies of videogames.14 But the
defendant in that case was hardly an unknowing intermediary; he had actively
solicited the infringing content, going so far as to reward users who uploaded
copyrighted games.15 In contrast, neither Klemesrud nor Netcom had any idea
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (Whyte, J.) [hereinafter Netcom].
12 Id. at 1365 n.3.
13 Id. at 1366.
14 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Wilken, J.). There was
also a second case in which RTC sued the operators of an electronic bulletin board for posting
copyrighted Scientology materials without a license, but it was not a case of intermediary liability;
the operators were anti-Scientology activists who had posted the materials themselves. See
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Colo. 1995); see also Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Va. 1995) (rejecting preliminary injunction against
activist’s posting of Scientology materials online).
15 Id. at 683-84. The same was true of a post-Netcom case with facts and reasoning quite similar
to MAPHIA: Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Sabella, No. C 93-04260 CW, 1996 WL 780560, at *7-8
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1996). Today we would refer to such cases as involving inducement liability,
a form of contributory liability. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
11
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that Erlich had posted the Scientology material until RTC contacted them.16
The only case on the books that involved an online intermediary unaware of
its user’s infringement was a short opinion from a federal court across the country
in Florida, Playboy Enterprises v. Frena.17 George Frena, an operator of an
online bulletin board much like Klemesrud’s, had been sued by Playboy for
hosting user-submitted photos that had been copied from the well-known
pornography magazine. Frena claimed that he had not uploaded the photos
himself, had deleted them as soon as he learned of them, and had subsequently
monitored the bulletin board to ensure that his subscribers uploaded no more
Playboy material.18 The court assumed that these assertions were true, but it
made no difference; the fact that Frena oversaw the network that hosted the
photos was enough to merit summary judgment for Playboy. Frena’s
protestations that others had done the actual uploading and downloading and that
he knew nothing of it fell on deaf ears. Copyright infringement was a strict
liability transgression, and so Frena’s lack of knowledge was irrelevant to the
question of liability.19
In contrast, the Netcom court looked much more closely at the role that the
intermediaries had played in making the infringing content available. That Erlich
himself was liable was not seriously in question. His uploading of the
Scientology material clearly constituted unauthorized reproduction under 17
U.S.C. § 106(1), and the court had already found it unlikely that he would be able
to mount a fair use defense.20 Once the excerpts were uploaded, however, more
reproduction took place. Klemesrud’s bulletin board system automatically
created an additional copy and sent it along to Netcom’s servers, which then
made and transmitted copies to other nodes in the Usenet network. Indeed,
913, 930 (2005) (“One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct
infringement . . . .”).
16 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374 (“It is undisputed that Netcom did not know that Erlich was
infringing before it received notice from plaintiffs.”), 1382 (“A letter attached to the complaint
indicates that . . . notice was first sent to Klemesrud on December 30, 1994.”).
17 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). We will refer to this
case as Frena, rather than Playboy, because Playboy was the plaintiff in at least a half dozen other
seminal Internet law cases. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of
Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 964 n.188 (2010).
18 Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
19 Id. at 1559 (stating that “[i]t does not matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of the
copyright infringement” and noting that intent and knowledge are relevant only to determining the
proper remedy for infringement).
20 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367.
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within a few hours of Erlich’s initial upload, copies of the Scientology materials
had appeared on every Usenet server around the world.21
The question was whether Klemesrud and Netcom were liable for those
additional unauthorized reproductions. That liability could come in two forms.
First, they might be directly liable. In other words, by virtue of operating the
computer systems that made the copies, Klemesrud and Netcom might be seen
as having made copies themselves, much as Erlich had.22 Second, they might be
secondarily liable; even if Erlich was the only direct infringer, Klemesrud and
Netcom might have facilitated or profited from his direct infringement in a
manner that made them legally responsible for it.
With regard to the direct infringement question, the Netcom court did not
dispute that infringing copies were made, but it found that Klemesrud and
Netcom had not made them. Both parties merely maintained a computer system
“that automatically and uniformly create[d] temporary copies of all data sent
through it,” much like “the owner of a copying machine who lets the public make
copies with it.”23 Neither party initiated the copying of the Scientology
materials—that was Erlich’s doing—and the propagation of copies into Usenet
happened mechanically and indiscriminately once Erlich posted, without any
further intervention by Klemesrud or Netcom.24 Like Frena, the Netcom court
acknowledged that copyright infringement is a strict liability offense, but it
asserted nevertheless that “there should still be some element of volition or
causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a
copy by a third party.”25 (As we will see, this volitional requirement would prove
important later, when Congress took up the issue.)
21

Id. at 1367-68.
We focus here, as the Netcom court did, on liability for unauthorized reproduction of the
Scientology materials, because it’s indisputable that posting content to Usenet creates multiple new
copies of that content—and making new copies is the essence of unauthorized reproduction. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “copies”), § 106(1) (defining reproduction as the making of
“copies”); Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-71, 1381-82 (addressing direct liability for unauthorized
reproduction). Curiously, the Frena court had not addressed whether the defendant there had
engaged in unauthorized reproduction, focusing instead on unauthorized distribution under section
106(3) and unauthorized public display right under section 106(5). Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 155657. That said, Netcom’s focus on reproduction did not keep it from addressing the possibility of
direct infringement of the distribution and display rights as well; it disposed of them on the same
basis as the reproduction right. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371-72.
23 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1370.
22
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As for secondary infringement, it too came in two varieties. The first was
contributory liability, which applied to parties who knowingly and substantially
participated in another’s direct infringement.26 The court held that providing the
means by which Erlich’s Usenet posts were copied and disseminated to the world
constituted substantial participation.27 But the requisite knowledge was not
present when Klemesrud and Netcom set up their systems and signed up
customers like Erlich; at the time, they had no idea whether a customer would
use Usenet at all, let alone post infringing Scientology material (as opposed to,
say, sharing advice on homebuilt airplanes or stories about real and imaginary
bunnies).28 Later, however, RTC notified them of Erlich’s doings. Once that
happened, the court held, it was harder for Klemesrud and Netcom to plead
ignorance, and there was accordingly a triable issue of fact regarding whether
they then knowingly contributed to the infringement.29
The second variety of secondary infringement was vicarious liability, which
focused not on knowledge but on whether the defendants had the right and ability
to control Erlich’s infringement and received a direct financial benefit from it.30
RTC introduced evidence that both Klemesrud and Netcom could suspend
subscribers and delete postings, creating a triable issue on their right and ability
to control what Erlich did.31 But the court found no direct financial benefit as a
result of Erlich’s postings—no causal connection between his infringement and
Klemesrud’s and Netcom’s revenues.32
In the end, then, the court ruled as a matter of law that Klemesrud and
Netcom did not directly infringe RTC’s copyrights. This represented a clear
break with Frena, which had imposed direct liability for the exact same kind of
conduct.33 The Netcom court also opined on secondary liability (which Frena
26

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1375.
28 Id. at 1374. This enabled the court to distinguish Sega v. MAPHIA, in which the defendant knew
and even encouraged the uploaded of infringing content. Id. at 1371 & n.17.
29 Id. at 1374-75 (Netcom), 1382 (Klemesrud).
30 Id. at 1375.
31 Id. at 1375-76 (Netcom), 1382 (Klemesrud).
32 Id. at 1376-77 (Netcom), 1382 (Klemesrud). This too helped the court distinguish Sega v.
MAPHIA, where the defendant’s business model was built on soliciting uploads of videogames and
then charging for downloads. Id. at 1371, 1379. Note also that in Klemesrud’s case, the court gave
RTC leave to amend the complaint to include allegations of “direct financial benefit” sufficiently
specific to revive the vicarious liability claim. Id. at 1382.
33 As mentioned supra note 22, Frena based direct liability on the distribution and public display
27
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had not done), finding no vicarious liability as a matter of law but leaving room
for the possibility of contributory liability once RTC informed the defendants of
Erlich’s conduct.34
The small scale of the infringements here make it easy to overlook the
significance of the issue that these holdings addressed. In the 1990s, Internet
connectivity was transforming from a niche market to a ubiquitous utility. A new
generation of netizens was looking to create, rather than just consume, online
content. Hypertext Markup Language had recently arrived on the scene, allowing
unskilled users to create modern-day, multimedia websites.35 An explosion of
user-generated content lurked right around the corner—Geocities, Blogger,
Friendster, MySpace, Digg, Bebo, and other now-forgotten but once-dominant
platforms—the Facebooks and YouTubes of their day. Whether the explosion
would happen, however, depended on the direction copyright law would take. If
Frena were the governing standard, those who provided the connectivity
indispensable to Web 2.0 would be answerable for the liability of the users who
used their platforms to violate copyright law. Under Netcom, on the other hand,
the providers could operate without fear of liability, at least until a copyright
owner alerted them to a specific instance of infringement. The stakes could not
be higher. And all we had to guide us was two district court cases from opposite
sides of the country, and opposite sides of the issue.

of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works, whereas Netcom was more about reproduction. For the
purposes of allocating responsibility between user and intermediary, however, that’s a distinction
without a difference. The Netcom court seemed to understand this; it made some half-hearted
attempts to distinguish Frena, see Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370-72, but it did not seem to convince
even itself, id. at 1372 (noting that the distribution and display argument “suffers from the same
problem of causation as the reproduction argument”). The same goes for Sega v. MAPHIA. See
Netcom, 907 F. Supp at 1371 & n.17 (proposing ways to distinguish the case but also stating that
“[t]o the extent that Sega holds that BBS operators are directly liable for copyright infringement
when users upload infringing works to their systems, this court respectfully disagrees”).
34 The Netcom court also split with Frena in finding a triable fair use defense. Compare Netcom,
907 F. Supp. at 1380, with Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1159. As will become apparent below, however,
fair use has not played a significant role in mediating these conflicts between copyright owners and
online service providers; instead, the most important defense has been the DMCA safe harbors.
35 See, e.g., Yahoo to Buy GeoCities for $3.9 Billion in Stock, L.A. TIMES. 1999-01-29 (noting how
Geocities was founded in November 1994).
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B. Congress
1. The Road to Legislation
The Internet, by its very nature, is transjurisdictional. Having one legal
standard in one jurisdiction and a second, conflicting legal standard in a second
jurisdiction therefore presented online service providers with a thorny risk
management proposition. The conservative approach would be to default to the
more demanding Frena standard and simply not host Usenet posts and other usergenerated content. But doing so would throttle the growth of Web 2.0, all based
on a single judge’s opinion. And even if Frena had agreed with Netcom,
uncertainty would prevail, because who knew what the next court would do?36
Online service providers and copyright owners alike deserved a uniform, national
standard.
The case law might eventually produce such a standard. Federal district court
opinions like Netcom and Frena could give rise to federal circuit court opinions,
and then perhaps to a Supreme Court opinion that would settle the matter. That
would take time, however, and in the end there would be no guarantee that the
Supreme Court would take the case. It didn’t help that neither Frena nor Netcom
was appealed. Nor did either approach immediately begin to dominate in other
jurisdictions; some courts liked Netcom,37 whereas others favored Frena.38
In the end, given the importance of a timely, certain resolution of the issue,
there was no reason to leave it to the judiciary. Congress was the obvious
alternative. And as it happened, the Clinton Administration had created the
Information Infrastructure Task Force (the IITF) just a few months before the
Frena ruling.39 Comprising representatives from various federal agencies, the
IITF was responsible for developing a National Information Infrastructure, “a
36

Prior to the enactment of the DMCA, federal statutory law was silent regarding the copyright
issues that arose in Frena and Netcom; all the relevant law originated in court decisions. See
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (noting that “there is no statutory rule of liability for infringement
committed by others”).
37 See, e.g., Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distributors, 983 F. Supp. 1167, 117879 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
38 See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 551-54 (N.D. Tex.
1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999). Webbworld represented one of the few appellate court
decisions on the issue, but the Fifth Circuit’s opinion consisted of a single sentence: “We affirm
essentially for the reasons stated by the trial judge.” 168 F.3d at 486.
39 The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49025-01 (Sept. 21,
1993).
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seamless web of communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer
electronics” that would “change forever the way people live, work, and interact
with each other.”40 Among the subgroups of the task force was the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights, which focused primarily on the role
copyright would play in this new infrastructure.41 The idea was to translate the
Working Group’s findings into federal legislation that would fulfill the need for
national standards governing copyright online.
In July 1994, the Working Group released a preliminary draft report,
commonly known as the Green Paper.42 The report covered a multitude of issues,
but it consistently characterized the existing law in ways that favored copyright
owners over users, and its recommendations were similarly one-sided.43 On the
specific issue of online intermediary liability, however, the Green Paper was
more circumspect; it acknowledged the uncertainty over direct versus secondary
liability claims and over which particular kind of infringement was implicated
online.44 But by the time the Working Group issued its final report (the so-called
White Paper), the uncertainty was gone. The report cited Frena and MAPHIA
favorably45 and firmly concluded that “the best policy is to hold the service
provider liable” for its users’ copyright infringement.46 The fact that such
liability would require reviewing all user-submitted content before it was posted
was simply one of the “costs of doing business,”47 excused only in the
40

Id.
See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
42 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1994) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER].
43 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 91 (2001) (noting that the report’s suggestions largely
“echoed those made by [copyright] industry representatives” and that what it characterized as minor
clarifications “appeared to many interested observers to attempt a radical recalibration of the
intellectual property balance”). It is noteworthy that all but one of the report’s seven law-related
recommendations would have expanded copyright owner rights—and the one exception was
merely a call for a conference to discuss the narrow topic of fair use in libraries and schools. See
GREEN PAPER, supra note 42, at 120-39.
44 GREEN PAPER, supra note 42, at 40-42, 76; see also supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text
(explaining direct and secondary liability issues), note 22 (explaining section 106 issues).
45 WHITE PAPER, supra note 41, at 120-21. When the final report was released in September 1995,
Netcom had not yet been decided. See id. at 122 n.391 (referencing pending case).
46 Id. at 117.
47 Id. at 118; see also LITMAN, supra note 1, at 128 (“The clear implication was that henceforth,
this sort of liability would give content owners a deep pocket to sue; fear of liability would drive
service providers to agree to a variety of measures designed to choke off, deter, or avenge
infringement by their customers.”).
41
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vanishingly rare instance in which a user encrypted the content.48
The Clinton Administration then took the White Paper to Congress,
expecting that its recommendations would quickly become federal legislation
and thereby provide a much-needed national standard governing copyright
online.49 It turned out, however, that Internet service providers and others in the
telecommunications industry were not going down without a fight. And just a
few months after the White Paper was published, Netcom was decided, giving
the opposition a blueprint for an approach very different from the White
Paper’s.50 In the end, then, Congress did address the need for a uniform standard
for online intermediary liability. But as we will now see, notwithstanding the
Clinton Administration’s efforts, that national standard looked a lot more like
Netcom than it did Frena.
2. The DMCA’s Safe Harbors
Congress provided the solution to the problem of intermediary liability in
Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Its official title is the Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act,51 but Title II is generally
known simply as the DMCA safe harbors. Indeed, the phrase “safe harbor”—
although it does not actually appear in the statute—is key to understanding
exactly how the legislation addressed the liability problem. Rather than defining
the standards for copyright liability in the online world, as Netcom and Frena had
each attempted to do, the DMCA established four specific kinds of conduct for
which service providers would enjoy limited immunity from copyright liability.
In other words, Congress defined liability in the negative, setting forth four
categories of online conduct that would not lead to liability, but remaining silent
as to liability for conduct that fell outside those four safe harbors.
We will begin with the third safe harbor, both because it deals with the
scenario that Netcom and Frena presented and because it has proved to be the
most consequential of the four. Found in 17 U.SC. § 512(c), this safe harbor
WHITE PAPER, supra note 41, at 122 (allowing for possibility of exemption from liability “for an
on-line service provider who unknowingly transmitted encrypted infringing material”).
49 Jessica Litman has written the definitive account of the battle over the White Paper’s
recommendations—including those having nothing to do with intermediary liability. See LITMAN,
supra note 1, ch. 9. Indeed, her book is an excellent overview of many other aspects of copyright
law’s development at the end of the millennium.
50 Id. at 127-28.
51 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 201, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998).
48
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applies to “Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users”—
what we will call System Storage.52 In other words, this is the safe harbor that
deals with the fact pattern in which a service provider hosts copies of infringing
content posted by its users. So this is the safe harbor that would help resolve the
split in the case law discussed above and provide a uniform, national standard.
The System Storage safe harbor demonstrates that the White Paper’s
opponents had won the battle on this issue; Congress clearly chose Netcom’s
approach over Frena’s. Recall that Frena treated copies made, distributed, and
displayed by users as having been made, distributed, and displayed by the service
provider as well, thus leading to strict liability for direct infringement by user and
service provider alike. To avoid liability for user-generated content, then, service
providers would have to affirmatively monitor all such content and preemptively
remove anything that might be infringing.
In contrast, section 512(c) begins by broadly exempting service providers
from liability “for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider.”53 To emphasize this choice of Netcom
over Frena, a later subsection—section 512(m)—explicitly states that the
availability of the safe harbors was not conditioned on a service provider’s
“monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing
activity.”54 In essence, then, Congress adopted Netcom’s approach to direct
infringement, requiring something more volitional on the service provider’s part
before contemplating liability.
The rest of the System Storage safe harbor focuses on secondary
infringement. As we saw in the discussion above, secondary infringement occurs
when one is party liable for another party’s direct infringement, and it takes two
forms: vicarious and contributory.55 The Netcom court had addressed each form,
and here again the System Storage safe harbor followed the court’s lead. The
statute reiterates the two vicarious infringement elements from Netcom by stating
that the safe harbor applies only if the service provider “does not receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which

52

17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
Id. § 512(c)(1).
54 Id. § 512(m)(1).
55 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
53
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the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”56 Likewise
with contributory infringement; the statute acknowledges that the safe harbor
would not protect a service provider who gains actual or constructive knowledge
of its user’s posting of copyrighted materials and yet fails to expeditiously
remove them.57 This mirrors the Netcom court’s approach, which denied
summary judgment to the two service providers on the contributory claim due to
their failure to take down Erlich’s postings after receiving notice of the
infringement from the copyright owner.58
Indeed, System Storage envisions an important role for notices like those in
Netcom. From the copyright owner’s perspective, the main obstacle to
contributory liability was the service provider’s lack of knowledge regarding
what its users were doing. The most obvious way to overcome this obstacle was
for the copyright owner to tell the service provider about the infringement. Once
the service provider had that knowledge, its failure to take down the infringing
materials would mean contributory liability. The System Storage safe harbor
therefore explains what sort of information such a notice would have to contain
(e.g., identification of the infringed work, location of the allegedly infringing
material, contact information), and to whom it would be sent. Indeed, the safe
harbor required service providers to register an agent for receipt of any notices.59
In essence, then, the System Storage safe harbor codifies the sort of noticeand-takedown system that Netcom implied, but at a higher level of specificity.
The core idea is that once the service provider knows of the infringing material,
it can do something about it—namely, stop hosting it. But as in Netcom, the
burden was on the copyright owner to provide the specific information that
alerted the provider to the ongoing infringement and gave it the information it
needed to take it down.
Two of the three other safe harbors were modeled on System Storage and its
56

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
58 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374-75 (Netcom), 1382 (Klemesrud). Of course, knowledge is only
one of two elements of contributory infringement. The other element, substantial participation,
was satisfied by Netcom’s and Klemesrud’s providing the digital networks that allowed Erlich to
copy and disseminate the Scientology materials, id. at 1375, 1382, and section 512(c) likewise
assumes that storage of infringing materials “on a system or network controlled or operated by or
for the service provider” constitutes substantial participation, notwithstanding that the storage was
“at the direction of a user.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
59 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)-(3).
57
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notice-and-takedown regime. The safe harbor in section 512(b) addresses
System Caching, a process through which a service provider’s computers
automatically create a local copy of frequently needed data so they can access it
more easily. If the data contains copyrighted material, making a copy would
ordinarily raise the specter of copyright infringement; as in System Storage, the
provider’s network itself would essentially be providing the infringing material.
The statute therefore treated cached data much like hosted data. It granted
immunity for caching that truly results from an “automatic technical process”
initiated by the selection of data by a user, not by the service provider.60 But
notice-and-takedown applies here too: if the source of the cached data is taken
down in response to a compliant notice, the cached data is subject to takedown
as well.61
The safe harbor in section 512(d) likewise borrows from the System Storage
approach to notice and takedown. This safe harbor, which we refer to as
Information Location, targets service providers who do not necessarily store
infringing material themselves, but who help users find infringing material
posted elsewhere.62 (Think search engines, or websites with indexed links to
infringing materials.) Other than that distinction, the Information Location safe
harbor is very similar to its System Storage cousin; it does not shield service
providers from liability for secondary infringement, and it piggybacks on its
cousin’s notice-and-takedown framework for streamlining the sending of notices
from copyright owners to service providers, thus creating the knowledge
necessary for contributory liability to attach.63
The remaining safe harbor is unique. Found in section 512(a), it addresses
liability for online service providers who engage in Transitory
Communications—i.e., who simply act as conduits for the infringing
transmissions of others.64 Suppose that Netcom had not stored the infringing
Scientology material itself, but had merely transmitted it from Erlich’s computer
60

Id. § 512(b).
Id. § 512(b)(2)(E).
62 Id. § 512(d) (referencing “information location tools, including a directory, index, reference,
pointer, or hypertext link” that “refer[] or link[] users to an online location containing infringing
material or infringing activity”).
63 Id. § 512(d)(1)-(3).
64 The term “conduit” is a common shorthand for the kind of conduct section 512(a) addresses.
See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 39 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.,
Subpoena Enf’t Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2005).
61
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to some distant destination elsewhere in the Internet, through a process that Erlich
initiated, and retained no lasting copy on its servers. Section 512(a) limits the
liability for such conduct; all the service provider must do is demonstrate that it
is indeed a mere conduit.65
Importantly, Transitory Communications is the only one of the four safe
harbors that imposes no notice-and-takedown obligation on the service provider.
The reason for this distinction should be clear. The other three safe harbors all
deal with situations in which the provider is facilitating access to copyrighted
material in an ongoing way, and can therefore do something once it knows about
it (e.g., stop hosting the content, or caching it, or providing links to it). In
contrast, when the provider is merely a conduit, its involvement with the material
is so fleeting that a notice from a copyright owner could not realistically arrive
in time to make a difference; the provider might later learn that it had aided in
the transmission of infringing material, but that knowledge would come too late
to help stop the transmission.
So there we have it: four carefully delineated categories of conduct in which
online service providers could engage without fear of liability.66 Three of the
four deal with storage of third-party content, so they also provide for takedown
of such content upon notice. The fourth does not. Together, these four safe
harbors protect the kinds of automatic, indiscriminate data processing in which
computer networks commonly engage, and which is necessary for the operation
of any digital platform that handles content that originates with others.
3. The DMCA’s Lacunae
With the passage of the DMCA, Congress had told the country what sorts of
online activity would not constitute infringement. But because the statute merely
65

The statute sets forth the conditions that provider must satisfy to establish its conduit bonafides—
i.e., that it is indifferent to and uninvolved in the content of the transmission. See § 512(a)(1)-(5).
Whether this sort of fleeting transmission would lead to liability absent the safe harbor’s protection
was an open question over which there was some controversy at the time of the DMCA’s passage,
see LITMAN, supra note 2, at 91-96 (discussing whether transmission and storage of copyrighted
material in temporary memory constituted infringement), but which since has largely been settled
in favor of conduits, see, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127-29
(2d Cir. 2008) (finding no copyright infringement for temporary storage of copyrighted data in
course of transmission).
66 At least, without fear of the kind of liability that would have attached under a Frena standard.
As we will soon see, even when a safe harbor applies, a service provider can be subject to a limited
injunction under section 512(j).
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established safe harbors, the courts retained the power to define liability
whenever the safe harbors didn’t apply. Indeed, the statute itself explicitly
recognized as much in section 512(l), which noted that a failure to qualify for a
safe harbor “shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the
service provider that the service provider’s conduct is not infringing under this
title or any other defense.” In other words, being outside a safe harbor’s
protection didn’t necessarily mean a service provider was liable; it simply threw
the issue back to the courts, which were still free to fashion copyright standards
that favored service providers (as Netcom had done) or copyright owners (as
Frena had done).
At first glance, this might appear to be a purely academic point. After all,
the four safe harbors covered the most important issues in online copyright,
seemingly leaving little common law for the courts to decide.67 A service
provider that merely transmitted data no longer had to worry about whether a
court would consider such conduct infringing; even if the data contained
copyrighted material, the provider had the Transitory Communications safe
harbor in section 512(a) to protect it. A service provider sued for hosting usergenerated material no longer had to worry about whether the court would follow
Netcom or Frena; the System Storage safe harbor in section 512(c) clearly sided
with the former. And so forth.
All that would be true, were it not for two other features of the DMCA. The
first is that even when the safe harbors apply, they do not give service providers
total immunity. Instead, they each allow for the possibility of certain forms of
injunctive relief under section 512(j), essentially aimed at shutting down access
to specific online material or denying access to specific infringing users.68 The
We use the term “common law” with some hesitation, both because it is a loaded term when used
in reference to federal law, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no
federal general common law.”), and because “common-law copyright” sometimes refers to the
(mostly moribund) state copyright systems, see, e.g., Zvi S. Rosen, Common-Law Copyright, 85 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1055 (2018). Nevertheless, it is the term that best describes the judicial lawmaking
that takes place in federal copyright cases, which is the focus of Part II. The standards for secondary
liability, for example, are completely judge-made. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (noting that
“there is no statutory rule of liability for infringement committed by others”). And even when a
federal copyright statute governs, courts retain a lot of discretion in fashioning interpretive
standards. See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of
Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 719 (1987) (“[N]either the statute nor its
legislative history clearly defines the substantive showing a plaintiff must make to establish that a
party has infringed the copyright.”). Such standards are essentially common law.
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).
67
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clear implication is that even after passage of the Act, courts remained free to
adopt standards of infringement more unfavorable to service providers than the
DMCA was; otherwise, the injunction provision would be mere surplusage. For
example, in a jurisdiction that followed Frena, a service provider could qualify
for the System Storage safe harbor yet still be subject to a limited injunction.69
The other feature that complicates the DMCA’s protection is that in order to
qualify for any of the safe harbors, a service provider has to satisfy two threshold
conditions.70 The first requires the service provider to accommodate “standard
technical measures,”71 which refer to industry-wide technological standards
designed to protect copyrighted works.72 We can safely ignore this requirement,
as no court has ever recognized the existence of such a measure in the twenty
years since the DMCA was enacted.73 The other threshold requirement, however,
has proved to be more consequential: every service provider must adopt and
reasonably implement a policy under which it terminates the accounts of any
users who repeatedly infringe copyright.74
For present purposes, what these threshold requirements mean is that the
DMCA limited liability only for those service providers that both engaged in the
69

In contrast, a court that followed Netcom would see qualifying for the System Storage safe harbor
as proof that there was no basis for common-law liability, since Congress essentially borrowed
Netcom’s holding in creating that safe harbor.
70 There are arguably two other statutory provisions that might be viewed as threshold
requirements, in addition to those discussed in the main text—but which do not apply equally to
all four safe harbors. First, in order to take advantage of any safe harbor, a service provider must
meet the definition of “service provider” in section 512(k). Fortunately, the definition is very broad
(“a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor”) except
when the Transitory Communications safe harbor is at issue, when the definition is slightly
narrower, albeit not particularly constraining. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1). Second, as already
mentioned, in order to use the System Storage safe harbor a service provider must register an agent
with the U.S Copyright Office for receipt of notices from copyright owners. Id. § 512(c)(2), (d)(3).
Agent registration is seemingly also required for the System Caching and Information Location
safe harbors, both of which refer to section 512(c)’s notice-and-takedown system. (We say
“seemingly” because those two safe harbors refer to agent notification in subsection (c)(3) but not
agent registration in subsection (c)(2).) See id. § 512(b)(2)(E), (d)(3).
71 Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
72 Id. § 512(i)(2).
73 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering but
ultimately remanding issue). One court seemed to accept arguendo the existence of a standard
technical measure, only to find that the service provider had indeed accommodated it. See Wolk
v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
74 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). Service providers must also ensure that their users are aware of the
repeat-infringer policy. Id.
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kinds of conduct covered by the safe harbors and also jumped through the
regulatory hoops that the threshold requirements represent. That left open the
possibility that a provider could, for example, unknowingly host infringing
content and yet not be within the protection of the System Storage safe harbor—
because it neglected to establish a repeat-infringer policy. In such cases, the
DMCA would be irrelevant, and the parties would be back in the case-law world,
fighting over whether Netcom or Frena should govern.
In the end, then, the DMCA left significant gaps for the federal judiciary to
fill, one case at a time. For example, if a court preferred Frena to Netcom, it
could impose the former’s more demanding standards on any service provider
that neglected to satisfy one of the DMCA’s threshold requirements. Even when
those requirements were satisfied, qualifying for a safe harbor still left service
providers exposed to injunctive relief, under whatever liability standards the
judge deigned to apply. And when it came to conduct that did not fall within any
safe harbor, both liability and remedy were wholly in the hand of the courts.
Despite the promise of national uniformity, the DMCA simply had nothing to
say in any of these contexts—except, in essence, “good luck with all that.”
II. CONVERGENCE
We have now seen that in theory, the DMCA had no say in the continuing
development of the common-law standards for online infringement. The safe
harbors were just statutory defenses to a claim of copyright infringement leveled
against a service provider. The common-law liability standards, both direct and
secondary, could continue to develop on their own without regard for the DMCA.
Indeed, such development was, if not expressly set forth, at least implicitly
assumed within the DMCA’s structure.75
The reality, however, is the statutory safe harbors exerted a gravitational pull
on the common law. Before the DMCA, the common-law infringement
standards diverged wildly.76 After the DMCA, these varying holdings steadily
converged toward a more uniform national standard, a standard whose borders
look increasingly like the borders of the safe harbors themselves. This
“As provided in subsection (l), Section 512 is not intended to imply that a service provider is or
is not liable as an infringer either for conduct that qualifies for a limitation of liability or for conduct
that fails to so qualify. Rather, the limitations of liability apply if the provider is found to be liable
under existing principles of law.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. 639, 649.
76 Compare Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1380, with Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1159.
75
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convergence took place even when the threshold conditions were not met—i.e.,
even when the safe harbors played no role at all in the case. And when the safe
harbors did play a role, courts have essentially used them to define the borders
of liability, thereby ignoring the statute’s invitation to order injunctive relief
under section 512(j).77 Put simply, no court has taken the opportunity to develop
the common law independently of the contours of the safe harbors. Instead, the
DMCA safe harbors and common-law standards, after twenty years, are almost
identical.
The following discussion summarizes this process of convergence. We
begin by setting forth a framing structure that categorizes the possible paths the
common law could have taken after the DMCA was enacted—some of which are
convergent and some of which are divergent. We then discuss the circumstances
that made each outcome a real possibility, rather than merely a professor’s
thought experiment; convergence may look inevitable in retrospect, but it was
anything but. Finally, we show that despite those circumstances, and despite the
two divergent possibilities, the actual case law has moved in a consistently
convergent direction, heavily influenced by the statutory standards even when
the statute was not at issue. This will set the stage for Part III, in which we will
see that although convergence might appear benign, it has a dark side that is both
unexpected and unwelcome.
A. Theoretical Paths of Con/Divergence
As discussed above, the DMCA theoretically left open the possibility that
common-law standards could develop in any number of directions, some of
which would converge with the statutory safe harbor standards, others of which
would diverge.78 To better understand these possibilities, consider the following
matrix.

77

17 U.S.C. § 512(j).
See, e.g., id. § 512(l) (“Other defenses not affected.—The failure of a service provider’s conduct
to qualify for limitation of liability under this section shall not bear adversely upon the
consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider’s conduct is not
infringing under this title or any other defense.”).
78
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Common-Law
Liability
Standards

Table 1: Con/Divergence Scenarios
DMCA Safe Harbor Standards
Δ’s conduct falls
Δ’s conduct falls
within safe harbor outside safe harbor
Δ not liable

Δ liable

A
Convergence

C
Divergence

B
Divergence

D
Convergence

As Table 1 illustrates, the common law and the DMCA safe harbors can
interact in four different ways. Start with Box A, in the upper left. As the column
heading indicates, defendants who fall within this box are engaging in conduct
that falls within one of the DMCA safe harbors. For example, suppose a service
provider (let’s call it Comnet) hosts Usenet content, is told by RTC of a user’s
infringing posts, and takes them down immediately in response. Comnet’s
conduct would thereby fall within the System Storage safe harbor in section
512(c). Now consider the row heading for Box A: it indicates that the defendant
is not liable under the applicable case law. That would be the case if Comnet
were judged by the Netcom court’s standard, since that court held that it was only
the service provider’s failure to take down the content upon notice that prevented
it from escaping liability.79 Thus we have convergence of the two sets of
standards: the same conduct that qualifies the service provider for the safe harbor
rescues it from liability.
It does not have to be so. Turn to Box B in the matrix, and consider the same
facts: Comnet takes down the infringing content upon notice. We know that that
means the System Storage safe harbor is available. Now, however, we are in a
jurisdiction that follows Frena. As the row heading indicates, Comnet would
still be liable, because Frena predicated liability on the mere hosting of the
content, whether knowing or not.80 So here we would have a divergence of
standards, in that conduct that falls within a safe harbor is nonetheless a basis for
liability. Of course, if the safe harbor applied in such a case, the only available
79
80

Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1159.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233113

Convergence and Conflation in Online Copyright

21

remedy would be a limited injunction under section 512(j); that’s the point of the
safe harbor.81 Yet it is the existence of section 512(j) that actually proves that
this sort of divergence is possible—that the DMCA contemplates such an
outcome.
Move now to Box C. Here the column heading indicates that no safe harbor
applies. So change the facts of the hypothetical: this time, Comnet does not take
down the infringing material, even after it receives sufficient notice. Its conduct
therefore falls outside the System Storage safe harbor. Yet that does not
necessarily mean that it is liable for infringement. As we have already seen,
section 512(l) explicitly states that failure to qualify for a safe harbor “shall not
bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that
the service provider’s conduct is not infringing under this title . . . .”82 To be
sure, even the Netcom ruling implies that liability would follow.83 But just as
courts remain free to depart from Netcom by being more demanding of service
providers, as Frena did, they also remain free to go the opposite way and apply
more relaxed standards. For example, a court might decide that a service
provider like Comnet is a mere utility, like the electric company, too far removed
from the direct infringement to be liable even when it knows what its customer
is doing.84 A court that went in this direction would be diverging from the safe
harbor standards.
Finally, Box D. Again, as the column heading indicates, Comnet’s failure to
take down the infringing material disqualifies it from the safe harbor’s protection.
But now the court decides that the same failure is ground for imposing liability,
as the Netcom court seemed to contemplate. As with Box A, we have
convergence, but in the inverse: the same conduct that puts the provider outside
of the safe harbor also renders it liable.
In the end, then, the DMCA left open a variety of possibilities, and courts
could develop common-law liability standards as they saw fit. To the extent
those standards mirrored the safe harbors, the cases would all end up in Box A
or D of the matrix, and we would see convergence. To the extent that they
developed more or less demanding standards, we would see cases that belong in
81

17 U.S.C. § 512(j).
Id. § 512(l).
83 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1380.
84 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 800 (9th Cir. 2007) (implying that
a company providing electricity to an infringer would not be contributorily liable even if done
knowingly).
82

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233113

Convergence and Conflation in Online Copyright

22

Boxes B and C—evidence of divergence. When we begin our exploration of the
post-DMCA case law, we will apply this framing device to the holdings. (Spoiler
alert: they converge.)
B. Practical Opportunities for Common-Law Development
Not only did the DMCA theoretically allow for either convergence or
divergence, but it also created real opportunities for courts to choose either path.
These opportunities were a function of two particular features of the DMCA.
One feature is the threshold requirements. As explained above, the DMCA
denies its protection to service providers who do not reasonably implement a
repeat infringer policy or accommodate standard technical measures, even if the
provider is engaging the very kind of automatic, indiscriminate data processing
that the DMCA was designed to protect.85 Unlike the four safe harbors, however,
the threshold requirements are not related to any theory of liability; they are
simply a regulatory price that providers must pay to get the Act’s benefits.
Indeed, when we say that a defendant’s conduct falls within one of the DMCA
safe harbors—and this is an important point for understanding where cases fall
in our matrix—we are not saying that the DMCA actually applies. It’s entirely
possible for a service provider’s conduct to fall within a safe harbor, only to see
the DMCA rendered inapplicable because the provider failed to satisfy one of the
threshold requirements.
What the threshold requirements do, however, is create real potential for
development of the common law of infringement. After all, if the DMCA
applies, the court might decline to articulate liability standards at all, because the
statute mostly settles the question, leaving only the possibility of a section 512(j)
injunction (which the copyright owner might not pursue). But when a threshold
requirement goes unmet, the court has to deal with the question of common-law
liability, even as to defendants whose conduct would otherwise fall within a safe
harbor. The potential for lawmaking in the shadow of the DMCA is real.86
The other feature of the DMCA that lends itself to common-law development
is that the safe harbors are an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright
85

See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
As is the potential for private ordering in the shadow of the DMCA. See Sag, supra note 3
(discussing ways in which private agreements and automated systems now mediate relationship
between copyright owners and online platforms).
86
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infringement.87 As a matter of civil procedure, then, even when the DMCA safe
harbors are in play, courts should decide infringement first.88 If the copyright
owner cannot carry its burden of proving infringement, then there is no need for
a defense. This procedure is sometimes honored in the breach,89 but we will soon
see that there are a number of cases in which courts did indeed determine and
apply the common-law standards for infringement, moving to the DMCA only if
such infringement was proved.90 For example, in A&M Records v. Napster, an
early post-DMCA case, the Ninth Circuit first did a liability analysis and only
then turned to the DMCA—resisting the plaintiffs’ invitation to view them as one
and the same.91
Together, the threshold requirements and procedural posture of the safe
harbors mean that there are many cases in which courts have not only the
theoretical authority to develop their own liability standards, but also the
practical opportunity to do so. We therefore turn to an examination of such cases,
in which courts have taken this opportunity to articulate common-law
infringement standards in the shadow of the DMCA.
C. Convergence in the Case Law
We divide the case law into two categories: cases in which courts found no
liability for copyright infringement and cases in which they did find such
liability. Each category contains cases in which the court had an opportunity to
opine on the common-law standards for liability, separate and apart from the
standards for qualifying for a safe harbor. To establish convergence, we will
examine the cases in the first category to see if the defendant’s conduct also falls
within a safe harbor, and we will examine the cases in the second category to see
if it does not.

See Lee, supra note 4, at 244 (“The DMCA safe harbors are affirmative defenses that the
defendant must prove . . . .”).
88 See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 94 (2d. Cir. 2016) (“A service provider’s
entitlement to the safe harbor is properly seen as an affirmative defense, and therefore must be
raised by the defendant.”).
89 See Lee, supra note 4, at 244 (“[O]ften, the defense is invoked on summary judgment without
any determination of liability because the safe harbor can more easily dispose of the case.”).
90 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.04[A][1][d] n.145
(2015).
91 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
87
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1. Findings of No Liability
The first possible scenario starts with a finding of no copyright infringement,
with convergence resulting if the finding of no infringement also means the
defendant falls within a DMCA safe harbor. In other words, this scenario
corresponds to Box A in our matrix.
a. Direct Infringement Convergence
Convergence is most striking in decisions finding no direct copyright
infringement. As noted above, prior to the DMCA there were two approaches to
direct infringement, particularly for service providers. The district court in Frena
found that automated copying that took place via a service provider’s system
constituted direct copyright infringement by the provider, noting that “it does not
matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of the copyright
infringement.”92 The Netcom district court came to the opposite conclusion,
concluding that automated copying that occurs as a result of standard Internet
operations cannot form the basis of a direct infringement liability, due to lack of
volition.93 After the DMCA essentially adopted the Netcom approach, courts
have consistently cited the DMCA and Netcom, ignored Frena, and moved
toward a uniform standard of non-infringement for such automated copying.94
And this is even the case when the threshold requirements for the DMCA safe
harbors are not met.
This convergence first presents itself in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in ALS
Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.95 As with many early service provider
cases, ALS Scan involves Usenet and the unauthorized hosting of copyrighted
material—here ALS’s photographs of female models—by a service provider,
RemarQ.96 RemarQ did not choose the photos at issue, and all of RemarQ’s
copying was an automatic, inherent function of hosting Usenet newsgroups.97 In
analyzing whether this copying rendered RemarQ directly liable, the court found
that the liability analysis and the DMCA safe harbor defense analysis were one

92

839 F. Supp. at 1554.
907 F. Supp. at 1365.
94 R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors and the Ordinary Rules of
Copyright Liability, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 427, 438 (2009).
95 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
96 Id. at 620-21.
97 Id.
93
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and the same.98 It explained that the DMCA “provides certainty that Netcom and
its progeny, so far only a few district court cases, will be the law of the land.
Accordingly, . . . direct infringement claims [are] controlled by the DMCA.”99 In
other words, the Fourth Circuit determined that Congress, by creating the safe
harbors, pushed the common law in a particular direction, such that passive,
automatic copying cannot establish direct copyright infringement.100 Even
Westlaw appears to have accepted this view, using this analysis in ALS Scan to
conclude that Frena is “superseded by statute”—that statute being the DMCA.101
The Fourth Circuit went on to completely import the DMCA safe harbors
into the direct infringement liability standard in CoStar Group v. Loopnet.102
Like ALS Scan, the CoStar case presented the typical System Storage scenario—
with LoopNet, the service provider, operating a server onto which its users
copied CoStar’s copyrighted photographs without a license.103 The twist here
was that LoopNet had not met the threshold conditions for the DMCA safe
harbor, making this a case purely about the ultimate liability standards.104
Because the DMCA was unavailable to LoopNet, CoStar argued that Netcom
should also be unavailable. In other words, it asserted that Congress intended for
the statute “supplanted and preempted Netcom,” making the safe harbors the sole
determinant of liability and thus finding infringement whenever they did not
apply.105 The Fourth Circuit rejected this claim, embraced Netcom as the
governing standard, and held that “the automatic copying, storage, and
transmission of copyrighted materials, when instigated by others, does not render
an ISP strictly liable for copyright infringement.”106 The substance of the safe
98

Id. at 622-24.
Id. at 621-22 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(I), at 11 (1998).).
100 Id. (“Although we find the Netcom court reasoning more persuasive, the ultimate conclusion on
this point is controlled by Congress’ codification of the Netcom principles in Title II of the
DMCA.”).
101 See Keycite for Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
102 CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
103 Id. at 546-57.
104 Id. at 548 (CoStar argued that “[b]ecause LoopNet could not meet the conditions for immunity
under the DMCA as to many of the copyrighted photographs, LoopNet accordingly would be liable
under CoStar’s terms for direct copyright infringement for hosting web pages containing the
infringing photos.”). It was not clear why LoopNet had not satisfied the threshold requirements,
or indeed whether the court was merely assuming arguendo that such was the case.
105 Id. at 552-53.
106 Id. at 554. As the CoStar court explained, “[e]ven though the DMCA was designed to provide
ISPs with a safe harbor from copyright liability, nothing in the language of § 512 indicates that the
limitation on liability described therein is exclusive. Indeed, another section of the DMCA
99
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harbors and the direct infringement liability standard were therefore viewed as
identical, even when the DMCA defenses were technically unavailable.107 As
Tony Reese observed, under CoStar service providers “do not need a safe
harbor’s protection in order to avoid direct infringement liability.”108 This is
textbook convergence.109
This “Box A” convergence—finding no direct liability in the exact situations
where the DMCA safe harbors would apply—has also occurred outside the
Fourth Circuit. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in BWP Media v. T&S Software,
considered an online forum where users had posted copyrighted photographs
without a license.110 The defendant’s conduct was within the System Storage
safe harbor, except it had failed to designate an agent for receipt of takedown
notices, making the statutory defense unavailable.111 The court nevertheless
came to a similar conclusion as CoStar, resolving the question of direct
infringement by invoking the same Netcom reasoning that the DMCA had
codified: “every circuit to address this issue has adopted some version of
Netcom’s reasoning and the volitional-conduct requirement” for determining
direct liability.112 The court also dismissed the argument that without protection
from the DMCA, the service provider had to be liable.113 The court concluded,
like the Fourth Circuit in CoStar, that even though a service provider does not
provides explicitly that the DMCA is not exclusive.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. 512(l)). For our
explanation of section 512(l), see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
107 Id.
108 Reese, supra note 94, at 438.
109 CoStar, 373 F.3d at 555. In contrast to CoStar, the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Robertson, 357
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004), thought it was still an open question was whether this DMCA-view of
direct infringement still controls when the DMCA safe harbors are not available. The court
explained that “[t]he DMCA did not simply rewrite copyright law for the on-line world . . .
Congress would have done so if it so desired.” Id. at 1077. Accordingly, “[c]laims against service
providers for direct, contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement, therefore, are generally
evaluated just as they would be in the non-online world. Congress provided that [the DMCA’s]
‘limitations of liability apply if the provider is found to be liable under existing principles of law.’”
Id. (quoting S. REP. 105-190, at 19). The court did not, however, find divergence between the
liability and DMCA—instead it remanded the case back to the district court on the issue of liability.
Id.
110 BWP Media USA, Inc. v. T&S Software Assocs., Inc., 852 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2017).
111 Id. at 443.
112 Id. at 440 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666-67 (9th Cir. 2017);
Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 387 (3d Cir. 2016); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008).)
113 Id. at 443. The defendant had “never designated an agent,” and thus did not meet the DMCA
threshold requirements for immunity. Id.
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qualify for the safe harbors, the volitional-conduct requirement still applied.114
The standard set forth in the DMCA again clearly informed the actual direct
infringement analysis, despite the technical irrelevance of the safe harbors.
The Third Circuit has also adopted a common-law standard for direct
infringement that mimics the System Storage safe harbor. In Parker v. Google,
the court held that merely hosting copyrighted material does not constitute direct
copyright infringement, citing both Netcom and CoStar to support this
proposition.115 To succeed on a direct infringement claim, the plaintiff must
assert “volitional conduct on the part of [the provider].”116 And courts within the
Third Circuit have used this holding to render the DMCA analysis irrelevant. For
example, one district court cited Parker, Netcom, and CoStar in yet another
Usenet hosting case; in doing so, it applied DMCA-like standards even as it
recognized that its finding of no liability meant that “it need not and does not
address whether the DMCA applies.”117 By converging the direct infringement
standard with the DMCA safe harbors, the analysis can simply stop at a finding
of no liability—a finding increasingly identical to, and presumably informed by,
the substance of the safe harbors.
b. Secondary Infringement Convergence
A similar convergence takes place when looking at the development of
secondary infringement after the passage of the DMCA. As with direct
infringement, the cases have almost exclusively involved web-hosting scenarios,
where contributory infringement is a common theory of liability. And the
common-law knowledge standard for contributory infringement has steadily
moved toward the specific knowledge element found in the System Storage safe
harbor.
Recall that contributory infringement requires both knowledge of and

114

Id. at 443-44. The copyright holder also argued that adopting the requirement would
disincentivize DMCA compliance by benefitting those service providers that choose not to satisfy
the threshold requirements. Id. While the court dismisses this argument, the plaintiff does identify
a possible problem with convergence and keeping the DMCA. The redundancy makes such
procedural hurdles irrelevant, and wasteful, given that the “protection” is the same under the
common-law.
115 Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 Fed. Appx. 833, 836 (3d Cir. 2007).
116 Id.
117 Parker v. Paypal, 2017 WL 3508759, *5 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 16, 2017).
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substantial participation in an act of direct infringement.118 Prior to the DMCA,
many courts interpreted the knowledge element to mean mere knowledge that the
infringing activity was occurring, rather than knowledge that such activity
actually constituted copyright infringement.119 Nor was there always a specific
knowledge requirement. That is, general knowledge that infringing activity was
occurring would satisfy this prong of contributory infringement.120
In contrast, the DMCA is more forgiving. It excludes a service provider from
the Act’s coverage only if the provider has acquired more specific knowledge of
infringement. The most direct articulation of this heightened knowledge standard
is in section 512(c)(1)(A), which sets forth what level of knowledge will exclude
the service provider from the System Storage safe harbor’s protection.121 A
service provider falls outside that protection if it has “actual knowledge that the
material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing”
and if “upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness” it fail to “act[]
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”122 This level of
knowledge explicitly requires knowing the specific material that allegedly
infringes, and that the direct infringer’s activity constitutes copyright
infringement.
We see a similarly high threshold for culpable knowledge in the notice-andtakedown regime that applies in three of the four safe harbors and that (if
followed) protects a service provider from liability.123 The regime requires the
copyright owner to not only specifically inform the service provider of the direct
infringer’s activity, but also to aver that such activity constitutes copyright
infringement. Indeed, to qualify as a compliant takedown notice, the notice must
contain particularities such as the identity of the copyrighted work allegedly
being infringed, the specific location of the allegedly infringing copy, and an
affirmation—made under oath and penalty of perjury—that these allegations are
118

See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that a defendant is a
contributory infringer if it (1) has knowledge of a third party's infringing activity, and (2) “induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct”).
119 See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1, at 8:9 n.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“To be
liable for contributory infringement, the defendant need only have known of the direct infringer's
activities, and need not have reached the legal conclusion that these activities infringed a
copyrighted work.”).
120 Id.
121 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).
122 Id.
123 Id.; UMG Recording, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1021-22 (9th Cir.
2013).
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true.124 And this information must be sent directly to a “designated agent” that
the service provider tasks with gathering this information.125 In essence, this
notice-and-takedown structure creates a heightened knowledge requirement,
because only notices that meet these specific, high standards impose a takedown
obligation on the service provider. Indeed, the statute explicitly states that
providers can ignore deficient notices and still gain the protection of the safe
harbors.126
In the early days of the DMCA, then, there were significant differences
between the common-law knowledge standards for contributory infringement
and the statutory knowledge standards for safe harbor protection. And as we
learned above, nothing was stopping courts from continuing to apply those
common-law standards in cases where the DMCA did not apply—or where it did
apply but the copyright owner nevertheless sought a section 512(j) injunction.
Yet courts have not taken advantage of their independence. Instead, in the years
following the DMCA’s passage, courts have revised contributory infringement’s
knowledge element to fall in line with the heightened standards of the DMCA,
providing another point of convergence.
This convergence emerged early on with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Perfect 10 v. Amazon, where the court vacated a finding of secondary liability
under facts that would also qualify the service provider for System Storage safe
harbor.127 The court considered, in part, the secondary liability of Amazon for
hosting an alleged direct infringer’s copies of Perfect 10’s photographs.128 When
determining whether Amazon was contributing to its user’s alleged direct
infringement, the court cited Netcom and concluded that a service provider “can
be held contributorily liable if it ‘has actual knowledge that specific infringing
material is available using its system,’ . . . and can ‘take simple measures to
prevent further damage’ to copyrighted works, . . . yet continues to provide
access to infringing works.”129 Such a standard aligned the common-law with
124

§ 512(c)(1)(A).
Id.
126 Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (“[A] notification from a copyright owner . . . that fails to comply
substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered . . . in determining
whether a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent”).
127 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 503 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
128 Id. at 1156-57.
129 Id. at 1172 (quoting Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022, and Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375). The court
remanded the case to reconsider the contributory infringement claims and consider “whether
Google would likely succeed in showing that it was entitled to the limitations on injunctive relief
125
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the statute, departing from the earlier case law in favor of a standard that mimics
the DMCA requirement that a service provider act only when it has specific
knowledge of the infringing material. General knowledge was no longer
sufficient for contributory infringement, just as it did not disqualify a service
provider from the safe harbors of the DMCA. The standards for determining
culpable knowledge under both statute and case law converged.
The 2013 decision by the court in Luvdarts v. AT&T Mobility provides an
example of the tail end of the convergence in the contributory infringement
context.130 The court dismissed a claim of secondary liability because the
copyright holder “fail[ed] to allege that the [defendants] had the requisite specific
knowledge of infringement” regarding the copies that their networks were
distributing.131 Just as other courts after the DMCA articulated, mere
“conclusory allegations” of infringement are not enough—contributory
infringement requires specific knowledge.132 The convergence here is fairly
explicit and congruent, with the court using the DMCA notice-and-takedown
requirements to evaluate whether the copyright owner provided the wireless
carriers with the requisite knowledge to establish secondary liability. The court
explained that the copyright holder’s notice (a 150-page-long list of titles) does
“not identify which of these titles were infringed, who infringed them, and when
the infringement occurred.”133 And although the issue was common-law liability,
the court pointed out that these notices did not comply with the requirements of
the DMCA.134 The court explained that the DMCA, “by which the notices
purport to be governed, clearly precludes notices as vague as the notices here.135
In short, the court found no secondary liability for the very same legal and factual
reason that the wireless carriers would have fallen under the DMCA: the lack of
adequate and statutorily compliant takedown notices.

provided by title II of the DMCA.” Id. at 1172-73.
130 Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2013).
131 Id. at 1072. It’s not entirely clear from the opinion whether the defendants were engaging in
System Storage or some other service; all were providers of Multimedia Messaging Services.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1072-73.
134 Id. at 1073 (explaining that “[t]hese notices do not identify which of these titles were infringed,
who infringed them, or when the infringement occurred.”).
135 Id. (noting that the DMCA takedown process “requires the producer to provide ‘[i]dentification
of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is
to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit
the service provider to locate the material’”).
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2. Findings of Liability
The second convergence scenario involves facts that warrant imposition of
copyright infringement liability, along with a determination that the same facts
disqualify the defendant from protection under the safe harbors—i.e., Box D in
our framework. The cases under this scenario is not as numerous as under the
first, but it still exhibits convergence. Put simply, there is no reported case where
the court found safe harbor immunity after deciding the accused is a copyright
infringer. Instead, the case law, after finding infringement, always finds no safe
harbor immunity, with some courts contemplating short-circuiting the analysis
altogether due to convergence and concluding that liability negates DMCA
defenses per se.
In A&M Records v. Napster, a decision issued a few short years after the
DMCA’s passage, the Ninth Circuit directly considered whether finding liability
absolutely barred DMCA immunity.136 A&M argued that “Napster’s potential
liability for contributory and vicarious infringement renders the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable per se.”137 The argument was based, in
part, on the belief that the DMCA safe harbors so mimic the secondary liability
standards that once such liability was found, those findings would always
preclude safe haven under the DMCA.138 The Ninth Circuit resisted making such
a “blanket conclusion,” particularly at a preliminary stage of the litigation.139 Yet
the court did note that many of Napster’s actions that were relevant to the
infringement analysis also presented “significant questions under [the DMCA]
statute” regarding whether the safe harbors were available.140 The court stopped
short of embracing complete convergence, but its recognition of the congruence
of the dual inquiries was nevertheless significant, given that the DMCA’s case
law was still in its infancy.
The Ninth Circuit went a step further on the broad question of convergence

136

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1025.
138 Id. The argument was also based on an interpretation that the plain language of 512(c)—that
the safe harbors are just not applicable to claims of contributory infringement. Id. (“ The district
court did not give this statutory limitation any weight favoring a denial of temporary injunctive
relief.”) The court concluded that Napster “has failed to persuade this court that subsection 512(d)
shelters contributory infringers.” Id.
139 Id. (citing S. REP. 105-190, at 40 (1998)).
140 Id. (noting that some of these were procedural).
137
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ten years later, in Columbia Pictures v. Fung.141 The district court found
secondary liability by inducement because the defendant invited users to
download copyrighted movies from his company’s websites. 142 The copyright
owner argued that this finding practically precluded access to the DMCA safe
harbors, because an inducer cannot meet the substantive requirements of 512.143
In other words, a DMCA analysis was unnecessary because such the result was
a foregone conclusion under the facts that lead to the inducement finding.144 The
district court agreed, stating that the liability determination meant that a safe
harbor analysis was unnecessary—the defendant could not, as a matter of law,
gain safe harbor protection.145
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit was more cautious, citing A&M Records and
concluding, “We think it best to conduct the two inquiries independently.” But
the court admitted that “aspects of the inducing behavior that give rise to liability
are relevant to the operation of some of the DMCA safe harbors and can, in some
circumstances, preclude their application.”146 Again, the court was not willing
to reach the blanket conclusion that there was complete convergence between
finding liability and denying DMCA immunity; it noted that “[i]t is . . .
conceivable that a service provider liable for inducement could be entitled to
protection under the safe harbors.”147 But it recognized that the common-law
liability analysis, which occurs first, produces findings that are highly relevant to
the DMCA inquiry.148
Other courts, while not considering the convergence question so expressly,
have found liability and then used much of the same analysis to deny DMCA safe
141

Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1031.
143 Id. at 1039-40 (“Columbia argues, and the district court agreed, that inducement liability is
inherently incompatible with protection under the DMCA safe harbors.”).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1040 (“[I]f Congress had intended § 512(c)(1)(B) to be coextensive with vicarious
liability, ‘the statute could have accomplished that result in a more direct manner.’ ”) (quoting
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1045 (9th Cir.2011)).
147 Id. (emphasis original). The court explained that “[i]n light of these considerations, we are not
clairvoyant enough to be sure that there are no instances in which a defendant otherwise liable for
contributory copyright infringement could meet the prerequisites for one or more of the DMCA
safe harbors.” Id.
148 “[A]lthough, as will appear, aspects of the inducing behavior that give rise to liability are
relevant to the operation of some of the DMCA safe harbors and can, in some circumstances,
preclude their application.” Id.
142
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harbor protection. The court in Goldstein v. Metropolitan Regional Information
Systems provides an example.149 The court found that the complaint stated a case
for contributory infringement, based on allegations that the accused website
operator had specific knowledge of its users’ infringement. (This was yet another
System Storage case, in which unauthorized, uploaded photographs “contain[ed]
copyright notices within them,” making “it is difficult to argue that a defendant
did not know that the works were copyrighted.”150) Citing Netcom, the court
concluded that the defendant “knew or had reason to know that the use of the
[photographs] on the [] site was in violation of that copyright.”151 Accordingly,
the copyright holder properly pleaded contributory infringement.152
This finding of properly pleaded secondary liability, based in part on specific
knowledge, was accompanied by a finding that the website operator did not fall
under the DMCA safe harbors.153 The court explained that while the DMCA safe
harbors are a defense, the facts relevant to contributory liability’s knowledge
requirement also negate the defense’s availability.154 In particular, a notice from
the copyright owner, combined with the fact that the photograph in question
“contained a watermark indicating that it was copyrighted,” supported an
inference that defendant had sufficient actual knowledge to exclude it from the
protection of the safe harbors.155 Here we almost complete overlap between the
inquiries; the same facts that support a finding of infringement also support the
inapplicability of the safe harbors. The two converge, rendering the later analysis
irrelevant.
Courts have even imported the DMCA safe harbor’s “red flag” test into the
secondary liability analysis. Consider the recent district court decision in Venus
Fashions v. ContextLogic,156 from the same district as the hoary Frena case. The
allegation was that copyrighted fashion photographs appeared on the defendant’s
website without the copyright holder’s permission.157 The copyright owner failed
to provide specific notice of the URL addresses of the 17,035 copyrighted images

149

Goldstein v. Metro. Reg. Info. Sys., Inc., 2016 WL 4257457 (D. Md. Aug. 11, 2016).
Id. at *4-5.
151 Id. (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374).
152 Id.
153 Id. at *6-*7.
154 Id.
155 Id. at *7.
156 Venus Fashions, Inc. v. ContextLogic, Inc., 2017 WL 2901695 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2017).
157 Id. at *6-*7.
150
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on the site.158 The court nevertheless found that the defendant had “reason to
know” that the images were copyrighted and infringing.159
On its face, the Venus Fashions analysis appears to run counter to the specific
knowledge required by the common law and imported from the DMCA. But the
System Storage safe harbor has been interpreted to include a “red flag” test for
knowledge, where the inquiry is “whether the provider was subjectively aware
of facts that would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to
a reasonable person.”160 Here the court borrowed this standard from the safe
harbors and relied on it when determining secondary liability under the common
law.161 As the court explained, “[t]he objective knowledge required for
contributory infringement is consistent with the DMCA’s knowledge
requirement which measures apparent or ‘red flag’ knowledge by the objective
hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ standard.”162 The court even cites Netcom to
support this analysis.163 We therefore have yet another instance of a liability
finding based on facts that also suffice to deny protection under the DMCA.
***
What the foregoing cases reveal is that courts have consistently tailored the
common-law liability standards to reflect the DMCA safe harbor standards—
particularly in System Storage cases, which dominate the case law. To place
these findings in our conceptual framework, consider Table 2.

158

Id. at *23.
Id. (“ContextLogic nonetheless has ‘reason to know’ of the continued Images which have
appeared and no doubt will appear on the Wish Website in the future, as well as the indeterminate
number of slightly altered but readily identifiable substantially similar Images to those noticed that
remain.”).
160 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41 (2d Cir. 2012) (detailing the “red flags”
analysis under the DMCA safe harbors).
161 Venus Fashion, at *23, n.15.
162 Id. (citing UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1125-26; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii))..
163 Id. (“Also instructive is the relatively early and influential decision in Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Netcom”)”). The
court also relies upon Perfect 10 and Luvdarts, both cases explored above that evidence
convergence between the common-law standard for secondary liability and the DMCA. Id.
159
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Table 2: Con/Divergence Case Law
DMCA Safe Harbor Standards
Δ’s conduct falls
Δ’s conduct falls
within safe harbor outside safe harbor
A
C
Convergence:
Divergence:
Δ not liable ALS Scan; CoStar;
[No cases]
BWP Media;
Parker; Luvdarts
B
D
Divergence:
Convergence: A&M
Δ liable
[No cases]
Records; Fung;
Goldstein; Venue
Fashion

Noticeably absent from our matrix are any instances in which a court found
infringement under the common law but immunity via the DMCA safe harbors
(Box B) or no liability for conduct that fell outside the safe harbor (Box C).
That’s because our research revealed no such cases. Divergence simply did not
occur, notwithstanding the freedom courts had in the wake of the DMCA’s
passage to craft whatever liability standards they saw fit.
III. CONFLATION
In some ways, convergence is a good thing. First, Netcom was the better
case on the merits, so its takeover of the case law was a welcome development.
Second, as cases from the different jurisdictions converge around the statutory
standards, they also naturally converge around each other too, creating more-orless consistent liability standards nationwide even when the DMCA does not
apply. Even those that might dislike those standards have to admit that certainty
and consistency are good things.
But convergence also means that the DMCA’s inherent cost/benefit calculus
is now very different from how it was in 1998. In essence, the DMCA had
offered service providers a deal. On the cost side, all they had to do was comply
with certain easy-to-satisfy conditions: adopt standard technical measures,
implement a repeat infringer policy, and (for three of the four safe harbors)
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register an agent to receive takedown notices. The benefit they would receive in
return would be legal protection for vital parts of their network operations—
protection that was especially valuable in light of the possibility that courts would
adopt more demanding standards, as Frena had done.
What we will demonstrate in this final part of the article is that both sides of
this calculus have changed. On the one hand, the benefits of the DMCA’s safe
harbors have decreased, now that the otherwise applicable case law provides
essentially the same protection. On the other hand, the costs of the DMCA have
increased, because convergence has led to conflation as courts have begun to use
ancillary DMCA provisions as substantive law, which creates unwarranted forms
of liability and immunity alike. Our evidence on the latter point is a set of
troublesome cases, but we buttress our argument with some empirical data that
suggests that the recalibration of costs and benefits is having a deleterious effect
not just on the minds of judges, but also on the behavior of the very service
providers whom the statute is supposed to benefit.
A. Reduced Benefits
On the benefits side, the argument should not take long now that we have
reviewed the case law. Convergence means that the case law standards and the
safe harbor standards are essentially the same. That was not always the case. As
we saw in Part I, courts used to be all over the place on what constituted
infringement by service providers, creating great uncertainty as to what the
liability standards actually were. Convergence only occurred over time.
Now that convergence has occurred, however, courts are providing the same
certainty (and applying the same standards) without any need to resort to the
statute. And the utter lack of any divergent cases is ample evidence that the
liability standards have not only converged, but stabilized. No one thinks Frena
is going to make a comeback. Indeed, we see a court from the same district as
Frena deciding an online infringement case without even citing that once-leading
precedent.164 This means that a service provider can enjoy the benefit of the safe
harbors without actually invoking them. Convergence has made the benefits of
dealing with the DMCA essentially evanescent.
164

See Venus Fashions, 2017 WL 2901695 (not even citing Frena once). The court did, however,
get on the convergence bandwagon by citing the DMCA in its discussion of common-law issues.
E.g., id. at *23 (citing DMCA cases when discussing liability standards for contributory
infringement).
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B. Conflationary Costs
More significant, however, are the changed in the costs to service providers
of complying with the DMCA. Some of these costs have been present since
1998, such as the cost of implementing a system of tracking repeat infringers.
And as the amount of user-generated content on the Internet has increased, so has
the potential for costly abuse of the DMCA process, including “notices” that
purport to invoke the statute but in fact are not compliant with it—or, worse yet,
have nothing to do with copyright at all.165
Other costs, however, are the more recent result of convergence turning into
conflation. By conflation, we mean a mixing and matching of common-law
standards and statutory provisions irrelevant to liability to create new,
unintended, and unhelpful forms of liability and immunity. The following
discussion identifies some forms that this conflation has taken and the costs that
have come with it.
1. BMG v. Cox: New Liability
No case better exemplifies the transition from helpful convergence to
harmful conflation than 2018’s BMG Rights Management v. Cox
Communications.166 BMG claimed that its investigating agent, Rightcorp Inc.,
had observed more than two millions instances in which a Cox subscriber had
made one of BMG’s copyrighted songs available for download via BitTorrent,
the popular file-sharing program. Unlike almost every other service provider we
have discussed so far, however, Cox itself did not host any infringing content or
help its subscribers find it. This was not a case of System Storage. As the Fourth
Circuit noted:
As a conduit ISP, Cox only provides Internet access to its subscribers. Cox
does not create or sell software that operates using the BitTorrent protocol,
165

See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban et al, Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis, 64 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 483 (2018); Electronic Frontier Foundation, Takedown Hall of Shame,
https://www.eff.org/takedowns (last visited Aug. 15, 2018).
166 The full case caption is BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., and
we will be referring to three different opinions in the case: the district court’s summary judgment
ruling (149 F. Supp. 3d 634 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Cox SJ”)), the district court’s disposition on posttrial motions (199 F. Supp. 3d 958 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“Cox Post-Trial”)), and the Fourth Circuit’s
decision on appeal (881 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Cox Appeal”)).
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store copyright-infringing material on its own computer servers, or control
what its subscribers store on their personal computers.
The obvious question, then, is what theory of liability BMG proposed to
apply. Cox’s servers may have played a role in the upload and download of
copyrighted materials, but Netcom’s volitional requirement (which the Fourth
Circuit had adopted in ALS Scan)167 lays the responsibility for that conduct at the
feet of the subscribers, not the provider. As for contributory infringement, one
can understand imposing liability on a service provider that knows it is hosting
infringing content and fails to do anything about it, as in cases like Goldstein.168
Even Frena, the case most unfriendly to service providers, had involved a service
provider that hosted infringing material for others to download, rather than
merely providing Internet connectivity.169
But Cox hosted nothing. It merely transmitted data, some of which was
innocuous, like email and web surfing, and some of which was infringing, like
torrents of BMG music. In other words, Cox was the poster child for immunity
under the Transitory Communications safe harbor in section 512(a). It satisfied
all five statutory conditions necessary to qualify for the safe harbor’s protection.
First, Cox’s subscribers initiated each transmission.170
Second, Cox
171
automatically and indiscriminately transmitted the material.
Third, the
subscriber chose the destination, not Cox.172 Fourth, Cox made no lasting copy
of the material.173 Finally, the material was not modified along the way.174
Conspicuously absent from those conditions is any notice-and-takedown
requirement. As mentioned above, Transitory Communications is unique in that
respect; the other three safe harbors all require takedown upon receipt of a
compliant notice.175 The reason for this distinction is clear: if the service provider
is merely acting as a conduit, there is nothing to take down. In theory, a notice
167

See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-155 and accompanying text. We leave vicarious infringement out of the
discussion here; BMG made such a claim, but the district court did not seem impressed by it, Cox
SJ at 676, (calling the evidence “hardly overwhelming”), and the jury ultimately rejected it, Cox
Post-Trial, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
169 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
170 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1).
171 Id. § 512(a)(2).
172 Id. § 512(a)(3).
173 Id. § 512(a)(4).
174 Id. § 512(a)(5).
175 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
168
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could arrive while a transmission was going on, and the service provider could
terminate it midstream. But in practice, that would never happen; the timing is
such that any notice would occur after the fact, when the infringement was
complete. In order to stop the latter kinds of transmission, it would have to know
about them in real time. Once the transmission ended, the conduit’s ability to do
anything about the act of infringement ended as well, as did its role in providing
access to the copyright material.
Congress presumably knew all this, in that it gave conduits protection under
section 512(a) regardless of whether they receive notices from copyright owners.
In contrast, providers who host infringing material were participating in an
ongoing way, such that a notice could prompt a meaningful intervention. Thus
section 512(c) has a notice-and-takedown system. The same goes for caching
infringing material under section 512(b) or providing links to infringing material
under section 512(d), which is why those safe harbors too require takedown upon
notice.
If the Transitory Communications safe harbor applies, however, why is BMG
v. Cox a case of conflation, rather than an example of the DMCA working exactly
as intended? Well, recall that in order for any safe harbor to apply, the service
provider must satisfy certain threshold requirements, including the requirement
that it reasonably implement a policy of terminating repeat infringers.176 And
here the evidence against Cox was damning; the company had such a policy, but
it did all it could to avoid implementing it.177 Setting aside the many notices Cox
received from copyright owners alleging infringement by its subscribers (more
on them in a moment), Cox hesitated to terminate those subscribers who its own
employees learned were repeatedly infringing, and even when it did terminate it
often reactivated subscribers right away.178 The court accordingly ruled that Cox
had “failed to implement its policy in any consistent or meaningful way—leaving
it essentially with no policy.”179 What this meant was that, although Cox fit
perfectly within the Transitory Communications safe harbor, it could not take
advantage of its protection. The absence of a repeat-infringer policy rendered
the entire DMCA a non-factor, and the court would determine liability under the
common law only.

176

See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
Cox Appeal, 881 F.3d at 303-05.
178 Id. at 304.
179 Id. at 305.
177
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What we learned in Part II, however, is that this should have made no
difference in the ultimate outcome. Convergence means that the standards for
qualifying for a safe harbor are essentially the same as the standards for avoiding
common-law liability. And there was no question that Cox qualified for the safe
harbor; it was unquestionably a conduit, exactly as section 512(a) contemplated.
Only a threshold requirement stood in the way of Cox’s DMCA defense, and
such requirements had never played any role in the ultimate liability
determination. Indeed, no court had ever held a service provider liable for acting
purely as a conduit. The conduit’s lack of volition would preserve it from direct
infringement claims. And only one element of contributory infringement would
ever be present at any one time; by the time a notice created the requisite
knowledge, the service provider would no longer be participating in any
infringement or facilitating access to the material at issue. (This lack of liability
is exactly as one would expect from a world in which the common-law
infringement standards had converged with the safe harbor standards.)
Nevertheless, the specter of the DMCA—and Cox’s inability to use it as a
defense—haunted BMG v. Cox. The statute should have been irrelevant once it
was clear that Cox had not met its threshold requirements, but instead it reared
its head again and again. To establish the knowledge element of contributory
liability, BMG cited the many notices sent to Cox, notices which provided the IP
addresses of users whom Rightscorp had allegedly seen offering copyrighted
material for download.180 The district court agreed, stating that because the
notices were “DMCA-compliant,” they constituted “powerful evidence of a
service provider’s knowledge.”181 Yet not only was the court invoking a statute
that it had ruled irrelevant, but it was invoking it inaccurately. There is no such
thing as a “DMCA-compliant” notice for conduits, because the DMCA imposes
no notice-and-takedown regime on conduits.
In contrast, if Cox had been hosting infringing material itself, its receipt of
DMCA notices would have been relevant to its ultimate liability. As we have
already seen, common-law liability for hosting has converged with the System
Storage safe harbor in section 512(c), and rightly so. It is no surprise, then, that
every single case BMG v. Cox cited in support of the notion that notices could
180

Cox SJ, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 671; Cox Post-Trial, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 976; Cox Appeal, 881 F.3d
at 312.
181 Cox SJ, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 662. The Fourth Circuit later pushed back against some aspects of
the district court’s handling of the knowledge element, but it left intact the part about of the DMCA
notices, which the appeals court acknowledged as the “primary theory” for Cox’s liability. Cox
Appeal, 881 F.3d at 312.
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create culpable knowledge involved a service provider that was hosting material,
not merely transmitting it.182
One might ask why evidence sufficient to establish knowledge on the part of
a hosting service provider would not also suffice for a conduit. After all, in both
instances a copyright owner is telling a service provider about alleged
infringement committed by its users. The answer lies in the safeguards that keep
the copyright owner honest. For example, under the three safe harbors that
include notice-and-takedown the copyright owner must vouch for each notice’s
bonafides, under penalty of perjury,183 and civil liability exists for material
misrepresentation in notices.184 In addition, service providers can create a
counter-notification system through which a user can contest the infringement
allegation and have the takedown reversed.185 In contrast, a notice to a conduit
is not a DMCA notice at all, and is therefore not subject to these statutory
safeguards.
The most important safeguard, however, is that when the service provider is
hosting material subject to a takedown notice, it can examine the material and
verify that it appears to be infringing. After all, the material is on its own
network.186 In the absence of this safeguard, the provider has no choice but to
182

The summary judgment ruling cited Capitol Records, LLC v. Escape Media Group., Inc., No.
12-CV-6646 AJN, 2015 WL 1402049 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) (music streaming), Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV 11-07098, 2014 WL 8628031 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014) (Usenet
hosting), Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (photos on
websites), and Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). See Cox SJ, 149 F. Supp. 3d
at 671-72. The ruling on post-trial motions added Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, Capitol Records,
Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (music storage), Arista Records LLC
v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.Supp.2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Usenet hosting), and CoStar Group Inc.
v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 688, 706 (D. Md. 2001) (photos on website). See Cox Post-Trial,
199 F. Supp. 3d at 976. And the Fourth Circuit cited nothing but BMG’s brief. Cox Appeal, 881
F.3d at 312. All of cited cases involved the hosting of material by the defendant, not its mere
transmission. Only Ellison was at all ambiguous on this point, because the court included some
mystifying dicta saying that a service provider that hosted Usenet material for two weeks (and
therefore could have examined and taken the material down upon receiving notice) could still
somehow be considered a conduit. For procedural reasons, the court declined to rule on whether
section 512(c) also applied. Id. at 1081 & n.12.
183 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). Note that the notices in BMG v. Cox were apparently submitted
under penalty of perjury. Cox Appeal, 881 F.3d at 299.
184 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
185 Id. § 512(g).
186 This is also true in System Caching situations.
Likewise, Information Location service
providers can follow their own links or search results to the material in question and subject it to
examination.
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accept the copyright owner’s self-interested allegation at face value. This is why
it is so odd that the court in BMG v. Cox characterized BMG’s notices as
“DMCA-compliant”; to comply with the DMCA, a notice must include
“information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the
material.”187 With the information in the notice, Cox could not locate any of the
allegedly infringing material. It could only locate the allegedly infringing
subscriber. Identifying such subscribers was relevant to the repeat-infringer
policy issue, and therefore to whether the DMCA was an available defense. But
to focus on repeat infringement once the DMCA is rendered irrelevant is to
conflate a statutory defense with a common-law liability standard.
BMG v. Cox has accordingly occasioned a subtle but significant shift from
focusing on control of the infringement to control of the infringer. Giving a
copyright owner the power to compel service providers to block access to its
copyrighted material is one thing. Giving a copyright owner the power to compel
service providers to deny Internet access to actual people is another—especially
when it’s too late to stop the alleged infringement, and the only evidence that it
ever occurred is the copyright owner’s say-so.188 And the basis for this shift is
conflation: the court conflated a statutory threshold requirement with commonlaw liability standard, and it conflated the three safe harbors that require noticeand-takedown with the one, more relevant safe harbor that does not.
This is not to say that we should shed tears for Cox Communications, whose
internal documents demonstrated a contempt for copyright law.189 But contempt
is not culpability. The company’s blameworthy behavior made it an easy
defendant to rule against—yet those rulings have left other service providers
bereft of direction. What exactly are conduits to do if they want to avoid liability
for the infringement of their subscribers? Terminate after the first (unverified)
allegation of infringement arrives? After the second? The fifth? The hundredth?
What must the notice contain? The reason the answers are so unclear is that the
liability derives from a mishmash of statutory provisions that were never meant
to be determinative of liability in the first place.

187

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). A similar provision exists as part of the Information Location
safe harbor’s notice-and-takedown system. See id. § 512(d)(3).
188 Note that the court rejected the only way in which the infringement could be considered
ongoing: that subscribers’ mere offering of BitTorrent files was itself an infringing distribution.
Cox SJ, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 666.
189 See, e.g., Cox Appeal, 881 F.3d at 303-05. Those emails must have made for some gleeful
reading when BMG’s attorneys got their hands on them.
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Even the district court seemed to realize the difficulty its ruling presented.
After allowing the case to go to a jury, which found willful contributory
infringement and returned a verdict of $25 million against Cox,190 the court
nonetheless denied BMG’s request for a permanent injunction. In doing so, it
cited a long list of questions that Cox would have to answer to avoid violating
the injunction:
Is Cox required to suspend accused infringers, or simply terminate
them upon one notice, or after the second notice? What if BMG sends
ten notices for one IP address in one hour, or one minute? If the
injunction requires termination of “repeat” infringing subscribers in
appropriate circumstances, when is a subscriber a “repeat” infringer,
and what are the “appropriate circumstances” for termination? Does
the order permit or require suspension before termination? Can Cox
warn the account holder first? Is Cox permitted to give customers an
opportunity to respond to the accusations against them, or is it required
to terminate accused infringers and provide them no redress? If the
subscriber denies the accusation, what process will exist to adjudicate
the accusation by BMG? Can Cox implement a counter-notice process
such as the DMCA provides for storage providers? What if, for
example, the subscriber's computer was infected with malware, the
user's network password was stolen, or a neighbor or guest accessed
the user’s account?191
These questions are, as the court said, “well-founded.”192 But if they are too hard
for Cox to answer now, when it has several detailed judicial opinions to guide it,
how could it have known how to answer them back in 2011 when Rightscorp
started sending it notices? The Fourth Circuit was similarly uncomfortable with
BMG’s theory, remanding for a new trial under a standard of actual knowledge
of specific infringement.193
Despite these reservations, however, neither the district court nor the appeals
court pushed back against the central conceit of the case: that a copyright owner
can impose liability on a conduit merely by sending it enough allegations of
infringement (infringement from the past, mind you, about which nothing can
190

Cox Post-Trial, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 963.
Id. at 995.
192 Id.
193 Cox Appeal, 881 F.3d at 307-312.
191
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now be done) and demanding the termination of the targeted subscribers’
accounts. This goes well beyond any theory of liability ever articulated in the
common law. Of course, had the court affirmatively claimed to be articulating a
new form of liability—one that would apply even though the defendant’s conduct
fell within the Transitory Communications safe harbor—then this would simply
be an example of divergence, permissible (albeit singular) lawmaking of the Box
B variety. But liability’s ingredients here were explicitly rooted in the DMCA’s
repeat-infringer provision, which was carelessly mashed together with the noticeand-takedown scheme from an irrelevant and inapplicable safe harbor, emerging
from the oven as a new liability standard. Convergence has become conflation.
2. Ventura Content v. Motherless: New Immunity
Conflation can go the other direction as well, creating immunity that neither
the common law nor the four DMCA safe harbors contemplated. Consider the
recent Ninth Circuit decision in Ventura Content v. Motherless.194 Joshua Lange
is the owner and sole employee of Internet site Motherless.com, the content of
which is stored on servers that Lange owns and maintains.195 The site contains
over 12.6 million mostly pornographic pictures and video clips.196 The content
is uploaded by the site’s users, and the uploaders may or may not have created
the material.197
Lange actively screened much of the material posted on the site, removing
any child pornography, bestiality, and copyright infringement that he spotted.198
He screened out child pornography because it is prohibited by law, and he
screened out bestiality because some European countries also prohibit bestiality
pornography (and because some of Lange’s European advertisers voiced
concerns about this content).199
Traditionally, such screening is relevant to many secondary liability theories.
194

Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc., 885 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 601.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 601-02.
198 Id. at 601-02. In addition, “[e]ach time that a user uploads a file, he receives a warning on his
computer screen that says ‘Anyone uploading illegal images/videos will be reported to the
authorities. Your IP address . . . has been recorded. Any images/videos violating our Terms of
Use will be deleted.’” Id. at 601.
199 Id. “We have been directed to nothing in the record that establishes a factual dispute about
whether Lange actually exercises judgment about what to host beyond his screening out child
pornography, bestiality, and infringing material.” Id. at 607.
195
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Most directly, screening is evidence of the right and ability to control, one of the
two elements of vicarious infringement.200 Active screening can also create
specific knowledge of infringement, or at least the circumstances that can
establish such a level of knowledge, which is relevant to contributory
infringement.201
In a world of convergence, however, the same considerations would bear on
the availability of the System Storage safe harbor to immunize Lange. And not
surprisingly, the copyright holders of the uploaded pictures and clips pointed to
Lange’s screening as a basis for excluding him from the protection of the safe
harbor—and for imposing liability as well.202 They argued that the statutory
language grants immunity only if the posting of the copyrighted materials was
“at the direction of a user,” which was arguably not the case when Lange
screened each submission.203 And even if one views the postings as done by
users, Lange’s screening would seem to create the actual or red-flag knowledge
of specific infringement that would place him outside the statutory protection.204
So far, so good. But then, in response, Lange cited section 512(m) of the
DMCA.205 That section reads:
(m) Protection of privacy.—Nothing in this section shall be
construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d)
on—
(1) a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively
seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the
See, e.g., Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-63 (noting that defendant “controlled and patrolled” the
premises); see also Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.
2017) (quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th
Cir. 2013)).
201 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing “red
flag” based knowledge).
202 As one would expect in a world of convergence, the court considered the safe harbor question
and the liability question to be one and the same. See, e.g., Ventura, 885 F.3d at 608 (stating as
part of DMCA analysis that “[i]f the website provider actually knows that the material for which
relief is sought is infringing, or if the infringement is ‘apparent,’ he remains liable if he does not
expeditiously remove the material upon gaining knowledge.”).
203 Id. at 604 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)).
204 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(a)(i)-(ii)). As we have already seen, these safe harbor standards
map precisely onto the common-law standards for direct and contributory infringement. See supra
Parts II.C.1.a.-b.
205 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)).
200
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extent consistent with a standard technical measure
complying with the provisions of subsection (i); or
(2) a service provider gaining access to, removing, or
disabling access to material in cases in which such
conduct is prohibited by law.206
Lange’s argument was that this provision means that the act of screening can
never deprive a service provider of DMCA safe harbor protection.207
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Lange.208 The court found “it
counterintuitive, to put it mildly, to imagine that Congress intended to deprive a
website of the safe harbor because it screened out child pornography and
bestiality rather than displaying it.”209 The court “read section 512(m) to say that
Congress expressly provided that such screening does not deprive a website of
safe harbor protection.”210 Thus, the act of screening could not be used to deny
Lange of DMCA safe harbor protection, and, in turn, copyright infringement
immunity.
As in BMG v. Cox, this reading of the statute takes a provision irrelevant to
immunity—here, a provision that merely clarifies that service providers have no
affirmative screening obligation—and conflates it with the substantive standards
of the safe harbors themselves. Some fields of law have statutory safe harbors
that explicitly immunize screening from liability, such as section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act.211 But the DMCA is not one of them; section
512(m) merely removes screening as a condition for accessing the safe harbors,
without changing their substance.
Under Ventura, however, a service provider’s screening becomes a new
substantive defense, a new category of conduct for which the statute grants
immunity. Screening activity would normally be relevant to the specific
knowledge element, which under both the common law and the DMCA would
inform the liability determination. Instead, the Act mutates to expand the safe
harbors beyond the enumerated four and shield individuals like Lange from
206

17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
Ventura, 885 F.3d at 605.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (immunizing online platforms that block or screen offensive material from
liability as publisher or speaker).
207
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liability where it might otherwise be found.
This again is an act of conflation. Section 512(m) was never meant to create
a new zone of non-liability—i.e., immunity for screening by service providers—
yet in Ventura it does. This is likely the result of further reliance on the DMCA
to shape the general scope of copyright liability for service providers, as seen in
Part II above. If the common law and the statute were not so closely aligned,
courts would not so blithely invoke statutory provisions to render liability
judgments. And just as this conflation can create new liability, it can also work
in the other direction—providing immunity where it does not belong, and where
a court not distracted by the statute would never grant it.
C. Real-World Effects of Conflation
It’s no coincidence that we see costly conflation only after convergence was
basically complete. That’s when the distinction between common-law liability
and the safe harbor standards is most difficult to perceive, and where mixing and
matching of statutory and common-law standards is most likely to happen. Still,
BMG v. Cox and Ventura Content v, Motherless are only two cases. They may
not be a harbinger of more conflation to come. After all, hard cases make bad
law (as do bad defendants, much to Cox’s dismay).
We do have, however, two additional data points relevant to the conflation
we have observed in the case law—namely, the documented behavior of those
who have to manage DMCA compliance at the service provider level. The data
comes from a survey we conducted of DMCA agents at colleges and universities.
These institutions act as service providers for their students and employees in a
number of ways, and the survey tested them all. The full study is published
elsewhere,212 but of particular importance to the current discussion are two
results.
First, in order to send the survey to DMCA agents in higher education, we
needed their contact information. Fortunately, the DMCA requires agents to be
registered with the U.S. Copyright Office; failure to register means that three of
the four safe harbors are unavailable.213 What we found, however, is that despite
the consequences of not having an agent, over half (50.6%) of all four-year
212

See Christopher Cotropia & Jim Gibson, Commentary to the U.S. Copyright Office Regarding
the Section 512 Study: Higher Education and the DMCA Safe, IHELG Monograph 17-04 (2016).
213 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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colleges and universities in the United States had not registered one, and the
figure rose to 57.1% if we included those whose contact information was
outdated. We considered whether this was because public universities enjoy
sovereign immunity from copyright suits,214 but in fact the registration rate is
actually higher among public institutions, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: DMCA Registration
for Public and Private Colleges
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What this means is that in the world of higher education—an industry that
for years has been very much in the crosshairs of copyright owners215—more
than half of institutions do not think it worthwhile to comply with the regulations
necessary to gain protection from three of the four safe harbors. Back when the
DMCA was first passed, this failure to register an agent would represent
copyright malpractice. But in these days of convergence, when service providers
can receive essentially the same protection from courts without the need to create

214
215

See Coyle v. Univ. of Kentucky, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1017 (E.D. Ky. 2014).
See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 212, at 2-3.
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a DMCA infrastructure, it has become par for the course.
Now consider the second data point. The survey presented respondents with
three factual scenarios, intended to mimic the conduct captured in three of the
four safe harbors: Transitory Communications, System Storage, and Information
Location.216 The Transitory Communications scenario asked them if they would
feel “a legal obligation to take action” if they received a notice from a copyright
owner alleging that they provided Transitory Communications for a copyright
infringement. Astonishingly, 91.9% answered yes, even though no takedown is
necessary under that safe harbor.217 In contrast, only 76.7% gave an affirmative
answer when asked the same question about System Storage, and 62.2% about
Information Location—both of which actually require notice-and-takedown to
preserve the safe harbor defense.218
What does this second data point tell us about convergence and conflation?
There are a number of possible explanations for this seemingly strange result,
and we discuss them in our previous study.219 Among the most likely, however,
is that those service providers unsophisticated enough to register an agent in the
first place apparently maintain that unsophistication when receiving notices from
copyright owners. Like the judges in BMG v. Cox, they fail to distinguish
between the need to track infringers, for repeat-infringer purposes, and the need
to respond to a particular allegation of infringement, for immunity purposes.
After all, most DMCA agents in our survey were housed in information
technology departments, not general counsels’ offices.220 They can therefore be
forgiven for thinking that a notice is a notice is a notice, and that every notice has
the same legal significance. In short, conflation is occurring not just in the courts,
but in the trenches.
CONCLUSION
When the Digital Millennium Copyright Act became law in 1998, it provided
badly needed certainty in a world of inconsistent common-law standards. Its
enactment freed up entrepreneurs to harness the power of user-generated content
without fear of crippling copyright liability. Without it, our culture and our
The fourth safe harbor, System Caching, is generally not as important, and so for simplicity’s
sake we left it out.
217 Note that we conducted the survey before the BMG v. Cox case.
218 See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 212, at 6.
219 See id. at 17-19.
220 Id. at 7.
216
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economy would look very different, and not in a good way.
Today, however, we come not to praise the DMCA, but to bury it. The case
law has caught up with the statute to the point where the two have converged,
eliminating the unique benefit that the Act once conveyed. At the same time, the
cost of complying with the DMCA has risen; convergence has begotten
conflation, making it more difficult for courts and practitioners alike to
distinguish between substantive legal standards and ancillary, regulatory rules.
The wisest course for those who provide services online is to resist the Act’s
temptations and steer clear of its clutches altogether.
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